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CODES AND CODIFICATION. [Thisentrycon-
tains six subentries, on codes and codification in ,ancient 
Greek law, in ancient Roman law, in Islamic law, in Islamic 
law in A{rica, in medieval and post-medieval Roman law, and 
in United States law. Por discussion of codes and codification 
in Chinese law, see Chinese WW, Sources of, subentries on 
Penal WW and Administrative Codes or Regulations.] 
Ancient Greek Law 
The idea of gathering together the entire set of laws of a 
state, or at least its civil laws, in a single, systematically 
constructed law code is a relatively recent one. It is rooted 
in the natural-Iaw philosophy of the seventeenth century, 
and is a product of the Enlightenment. In Continental 
Europe, this idea of a national legal codification reached 
its apex with the enactment of the German Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch (BGB or Civil Law Code) in 1900; but despite 
the BGB's approach to technical perfection, it remained 
an illusion that one could "codify" the entire set of civil 
laws exhaustively and systematically. At present, develop-
ments in the European Union go in different directions. It 
would be futile to seek comprehensive legal codifications 
according to the strict standards of the nineteenth century 
in the poleis, the Greek city-states of the seventh through 
fourth centuries B.C.E. Nor is there any parallel among the 
Greeks with the codification ins ti tu ted by the Byzantine 
emperor lustinian in 630 C.E., when he had the works of 
the classical Roman jurists from the first three centuries 
of the Common Era excerpted, and promoted this edition 
as the generally authoritative text for the teaching and 
practice of law. Similar theoretical texts developed by 
scholars in ancient Greece were of no practical signifi-
cance, and were never adapted to any legal system. Thus, 
legal codification has taken many different forms through-
out the course of history. For Greece, scholars are restricted 
to seeking written documents containing large groups of 
legal regulations. One may also describe such documents 
as law codes, without necessarily wanting to measure 
them against Continental European or lustinianic stan-
dards (the Twelve Tables of Rome from the years 451-450 
B.C.E. would certainly be comparable). Untroubled by dis-
cussion of the European codification movement of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, many Anglo-
American scholars use the expression "law code" in just 
this sense. It is important to consider the actual historical 
context in which each set of legal records originated. 
The most famous example of an ancient Greek law code 
is the great legal inscription at Gortyn, on Crete, from the 
middle of the fifth century B.C.E. Here indeed we have a 
broad-ranging official text, but no literary sources that 
might explain its background. The situation of Athens is 
just the opposite: there, numerous reports of "codifica-
tions" purportedly date back to the seventh century B.C.E., 
but no single comparable official source has come down 
to us even reasonably intact. The following will treat, 
regardless of chronological order, first Gortyn, then 
Athens, and finally the other Greek states. 
Gortyn. In 1884 two archaeologists, Federico Halbherr 
and Ernst Fabricius, discovered, on a rectangular wall 
standing in the water of a mill canal in Gortyn, one of the 
largest , inscriptions ever found in Greece. In twelve 
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columns, more than six hundred lines of legal regulations 
were preserved in excellent condition; the entire text is 
around thirty feet long. The lines were written around 450 
B.C.E. in the ancient boustrophedon manner (just as the 
farmer "turns the oxen" when plowing, the characters run 
first from right to left and then from left to right, etc.). The 
monument had been, during Roman times-in the first 
century B.c.E.-carefully removed and rebuilt as apart of 
an odeon (theater); it can be seen today still in the same 
place. In loose, associative sequences of themes-though 
nonetheless in compact, juristically pregnant language 
and with highly developed legal technique-the following 
matters were regulated: conflict conceming the owner-
ship of a slave and the process for attaining freedom; sex-
ual assault and adultery; the division of property in case of 
divorce; legitimate and illegitimate children; inheritance; 
the sale of property; the ransom of a prisoner of war; mar-
riage between free persons and slaves; the purchase of a 
slave; the treatment of an heiress; bond and monetary 
debts; and adoption. In all cases, substantive law, sanc-
tions, and procedurallaw are closely mixed together. 
The text's content and prominent place of display in the 
city have led most scholars, with some justification, to 
speak of the City Statutes or Law Code of Gortyn. All the 
same, the neutral denotation "Great Legal Inscription" 
seems to fit better. The statutes belong to a continuous 
tradition in Gortyn, beginning around 600 B.C.E., of high-
quality recordings of laws; these have been found in the 
form of individual statutes on the walls of the temple of 
Pythian Apollo and on the north and east wall of the agora 
(marketplace), in the seven columns and other fragments 
of what has been called the Second Code. The particular 
subjects of the individual legislative acts speak against the 
idea that law was systematically recorded in Gortyn. Even 
the Great Legal Inscription might have arisen as a collec-
tion of individual situations, issued over time and in 
response to specific exigencies. 
One may therefore certainly dismiss the idea that the 
aim of recording laws in Gortyn was the codification of 
the entire legal system. Lawmaking intervened in life only 
on certain points. The background of the brisk inscrip-
tional activity in this small Cretan city remains cloudy 
indeed. In the literature, two opposite motives have been 
advanced for beginning to record laws in the Greek poleis: 
either the lower strata of the population (the demos) forced 
through reforms for their own benefit or, on the contrary, 
the aristocracy secured its domination through written 
laws. The view that the aristocracy, through the writing 
down of laws, limited the power of and exercised control 
over colleagues who held office as magistrates seems to fit 
better with the well-supported finding that laws were 
recorded in response to specific situations. Whether and 
to what extent the demos participated in this cannot be 
determined. The question that goes beyond the theme of 
codification-whether one may first truly speak of "law" at 
the stage when it has been written down in public places-
is not affected by this. It should be answered with a "no." 
In every extensively organized human society one finds 
legal rules for living together, regardless of whether these 
are displayed in writing. In the end, it remains a quest ion 
of definition whether one should designate these rules as 
"law" or "pre-law" (predroit). 
Athens. The idea that the legal systems of the Greek 
poleis were given them by archaic "lawgivers" sterns from 
the great Athenian philosophers Plato and Aristotle. Such 
men, called nomothetai, were also often active as arbitra-
tors (aisymnetai) in social conflicts between the general 
citizenry and the aristocracy. A great deal of modem schol-
arship can only imagine the product of this archaic law-
giving to have been codification. In Athens, Draco and 
Solon are weil known from literary sources of the fourth 
century B.C.E. as lawgivers of this kind, but no direct, epi-
graphic evidence has survived from the time of their work. 
A further act, which has also been understood as a codifi-
cation, took place in Athens at the end of the fifth century 
B.C.E.: a systematic new recording of the laws valid in the 
state at the time. 
Draco and Solon. Draco stands in the shadow of Solon, 
who was-anachronistically-praised by writers of the 
fourth century B.C.E. as the founder of the Athenian democ-
racy. Of Draco's legislation from the years 621 and 620 
B.C.E., only the law on homicide then remained in force. 
That he also gave Athens a "constitution" is unlikely. The 
law on homicide was reinscribed on stone in the course of 
the revision of laws in 409-408 B.C.E. In the process, the 
text was transcribed from the original axones-rotating, 
vertically oriented blocks of wood. The stone inscription 
comes down to us in very fragmentary condition. On the 
basis of indications in Athenian literature of the fourth 
century, modem scholarship sees Draco's law as a penal 
code, in which the punishment of homicide, at least, was 
codified. This view has been contested with good reason, 
since codification is quite unlikely for the seventh century 
B.C.E. Rather, Draco put in place a number of concrete 
measures, to deal with a civic crisis that followed fifteen 
years after the wanton killing of the companions of the 
revolutionary Kylon. It is in this context that one should 
understand especially the unusual beginning of the law: 
Draco regulated not the most common situation of mur-
der "with intent," but rather the very case of murder "with-
out intent." There followed rules clarifying who from the 
victim's family was entitled to "pardon" the killer and who 
was entitled to bring a private lawsuit for murder. A killer 
who fled to a foreign land was to be safe from vengeance, 
but might be killed by anyone should he set foot again in 
Attica. It is probable that there were also regulations gov-
eming killing in a fight and in self-defense. Only a very 
small part of the fragmentary text of the inscription can be 
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reconstructed from citations in forensic speeches of the 
fourth century. One may only really speak of codification 
if one takes as a criterion that a fairly large number of 
legal regulations on a given subject were recorded. The 
fact that the recording took pi ace in response to a con-
crete historical situation is not inconsistent with this. 
Traditions about Solon are significantly richer, although 
they are primarily conveyed indirectly, by later authors. In 
594-593 B.C.E. he was elected to the highest magistracy (as 
archon) and as reconciler (diallaktes), and instituted wide-
ranging reforms in all areas of the legal system; so me of 
his poems contain sometimes obscure references to these 
reforms. Although his laws were commonly viewed as a 
unified group by later Athenians, it is historically impos-
sible that all of his highly divergent measures in the fields 
of dvil, criminal, procedural, and constitutionallaw were 
brought together as a unitary codification. In addition, 
since the Athenians in the fourth century attributed almost 
all of the basic norms of their democracy to Solon, it is 
difficult today to determine the actual historical status of 
his laws. Eberhard Ruschenbusch did collect and edit the 
fragments of Solon's legislation that have been preserved, 
and the fragments are generally dted accorded to the 
numbering of this collection. No commentary on 
Ruschenbusch's collection has so far appeared, so one 
cannot really judge the author's reasons for including 
some fragments and excluding others as unhistorical. In a 
hypothetical ordering, Solon treated the following themes: 
homicide, property crimes, sexualoffenses, slander; dam-
ages, treason, procedurallaw, family and inheritance law, 
the heiress, the economy (he banned the enslavement of 
debtors), sumptuary laws, and pederasty. In his great work 
of reform are included some foundational regulations, but 
often his statutes address minor details. 
A new recording of the laws: 410-409 through 400-
399 B.C.E. A very different kind of measure, generally 
described as "codification," was instituted in Athens 
around the end of the Peloponnesian War. Here there was 
not, as in the Archaic period, a single individuallawgiver 
(nomothetes) with full powers, rather a commission of ten 
citizens. They were to serve as recorders (anagrapheis) 
of the old "Solonic" laws, to systematically collect and 
record them anew. The political motive lay in the desire to 
purify the system of undemocratic statutes enacted by the 
politically defeated oligarchy and the Thirty Tyrants who 
had been expelled in a civil war. The general consensus is 
that this new recording of existing laws came very elose to 
a codification. Two of the surviving legal speeches (Lysias, 
Against Nicomachus, and Andocides, On the Mysteries) 
give precise information about the technical details of the 
codification work, and a few fragments öf stone inscrip-
tions show the practical results of this work. 
That said, the new recording of the laws was far from 
what is today expected from a codification. It did not 
produce a wall inscribed with substantive legal provisions, 
as at Gortyn, though it did produce a sacrificial calendar. 
A great number of the laws remained unwritten, as before. 
The individual laws that were collected were ordered 
according to the magistrates (the council and the new 
archon) responsible for administering them. This system, 
which is in contrast to the familiar connections of a mod-
ern legal system-civil, criminal. procedural, and public 
law-makes clear the deeper sense of any codification: the 
laws recorded are directed not at the courts-citizens act-
ing as jurors-but at administrative authorities. The high-
est magistrates of the state were supposed to be bound by 
laws approved by the democracy, in order to prevent a 
new descent into oligarchy or tyranny. Only the magis-
trates could be held personally responsible for not com-
plying with a law. Jurors did swear to decide according to 
the laws, but since they voted in secret and their decision 
was not subject to appeal, a member of the jury could 
never be sued for transgressing the law. 
Among the other legislative mechanisms introduced 
after 403~02 B.C.E. for the protection of the democracy, 
one oft-misunderstood provision should be noted here: 
Andocides cites a law that forbids the authorities "to use 
an unwritten law (agraphos nomos)." It would, however, 
be wrong to draw from this the conclusion that in Athens 
after 403~02 only codified law was valid, and that no 
argument based on justice that transcended the law could 
be brought before the court. If one takes this statute liter-
ally and understands it in its historical context-namely, 
the purging from the legal system of undemocratic laws-
it means only that the authorities may not use any law 
that has not traveled the route of being reviewed and "re-
recorded" as unobjectionable. In this way, the agraphos 
nomos loses any philosophical dimension, as weIl as all its 
value as evidence of a complete codification of Athenian 
law around 400 B.C.E. 
Other States. As the evidence from Gortyn and the 
newer interpretation of Draco and Solon suggest, one can-
not simply assurne that at the beginning of the develop-
ment of the Greek city-states stood "lawgivers" -people 
who created a constitution and codified a legal system for 
their fellow citizens or for a foreign polis. Thus Lycurgus 
did not provide his "constitution"-which regulated not 
only legal relations but also all other areas of life for the 
Spartans-in written form; his "laws" were handed down 
orally as a rhetra. Regarding the other nomothetai such as 
Charondas of Catania, Zaleucus of Lokroi, Pittakus of 
Mytilene, or Demonax of Mantinea, there is not sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate from their works a "Panhellenic 
wave of codification" in the Archaic period, even if these 
men were important for the step from an oral to a written 
culture of law. In the classical era there are no known 
attempts at a comprehensive recording of the laws, beside 
that of Athens. In the Hellenistic period, various treaties 
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of alliance or legal aid indude broad-ranging sections on 
civil and procedurallaw, which come dose to codification 
in certain ways. In the papyri of Egypt, we find extensive 
parts of procedurallaw regulated in city statutes and in a 
jurisdictional edict of the Ptolemaic king. 
[See also Ancient Greek Law, subentries on The Archaic 
period and Hellenistic Law; and Gortyn.] 
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Courts and Magistrates in Ancient 
Athens 
This article deals with law courts and the magistrates who 
conducted the preliminaries of lawsuits and presided over 
courts in Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.E. 
There is sufficient evidence in the sources for only this 
period; most helpful is the Constitution of Athens 
(Athenaiön politeia) of Aristotle, written about 329-322 
B.C.E. (Rhodes, pp. 51--63), chapters 43--69 of which out-
line this issue. From the end of the fifth century to the 
time of Ath. Pol., speeches of the ten Attic Orators also 
give good insight into the way that jurisdiction worked in 
practice. In addition, statutes written on stone from the 
beginning of the fifth and in the fourth centuries B.C.E. can 
be consulted. For good reason, the manuals cited in the 
bibliography (e.g., Lipsius, Harrison, MacDowell, Hansen, 
and Todd) concentrate on "the period of the orators"; the 
historical development beginning in the Archaic period 
described by Bonner and Smith I is out of date. Here, only 
a few words about the earlier period are necessary to 
address the question of historical continuity. 
In the fifth and fourth centuries, every Athenian lawsuit 
proceeded in two stages: a preliminary stage before a 
magistrate and a trial before a court normally presided 
over by the same magistrate. How old is this division? Ath. 
Pol. 3.5 indicates that in early times magistrates them-
selves decided cases, replacing in that function their fore-
runner, the king (Bonner and Smith I, pp. 84, 152; 
Harrison, pp. 1'-3). According to Ath. Pol. 9.1 Solon 
(archon in 594/593) introduced as one of his most demo-
cratic reforms an "appeal" from the magistrates' decisions 
to the people, constituted as an assembly called heliaia. It 
is not clear how this right of the people to hear cases on 
appeal had developed into the right to hear them in thc 
first instance in the fifth century. Perhaps as early as thc 
seventh century, at least since the laws of Draco (6211620), 
magistrates did not in fact decide lawsuits on their Own 
authority but, rather, declared a formula whereby litigants 
could reach adecision, by swearing oaths. In homicide 
cases, both the claimant and the defendant had to swear 
oaths specified by magistrates, and a jury had to decide 
wh ich oath was the better one (Thür, 1996, p. 71; 2004, pp. 
36-38). Solon may have extended this system to aB kinds 
of lawsuits. Thus, "appeal" in Ath. Pol. 9.1 might be a mis-
leading translation of the noun ephesis (from ephienai, lit-
erally "to leave to another to decide"). Procedural oaths 
sworn by both litigants in the preliminary stage of any 
lawsuit survived until the fourth century (Ant. 6.16, Is. 3.6; 
see Harrison, p. 99). Although oaths lost much of their 
social importance, one can suppose that in Athens the 
structure of jurisdiction did not change from monocratic 
to democratic decisions but rather from irrational to more 
rational decisions. 
Whatever the historical development may have been, it 
is generally admitted that in classical times a lawsuit 
passed through these two stages. In the first, the claimant 
had to file his suit with the magistrate in charge, who con-
ducted the preliminaries of the case, such as checking 
procedural requirements and giving the litigants the 
opportunity to prepare their points for the trial by ques-
tioning each other. One may call this stage "dialectical"; it 
normaBy extended to several meetings. Depending on 
which magistrate conducted the preliminary stage, it was 
called anakrisis, prodikasiai, or diaita. The next stage was 
the trial at a law court. A panel of laymen citizens always 
decided the issue in a session lasting at most one day; 
they voted immediately after the parties gave their 
speeches, and their decision was final. Because speeches 
dominated in this stage, it may be called the "rhetorical" 
stage. The instructing magistrate presided over the court 
but had no influence on the verdict, not even a vote. A 
peculiarity of Athenian procedure was that a large num-
ber of magistrates (archai, sing. arche) conducted law-
suits but in general only one kind of jury court gave 
decisions, the dikasterion (pI. dikasteria). This varied only 
in the number of citizens appointed as jurors (dikastai, 
sing. dikastes), normally from 201 to 1501. In the few 
cases when other boards conducted the trial, it proceeded 
in the same way. 
This article will first discuss the judicial magistrates, 
then the law courts. A short outline of arbitration and rec-
onciliation will follow. The main references for this article 
are Harrison and Hansen. 
Judicial Magistrates. Unlike Rome where, especially in 
private cases, jurisdiction was concentrated in the office 
of the praetor, who had no other responsibility, in Athens 
every magistrate held jurisdiction within his province. 
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Aischines (3.14, 27) characterizes the essentials of a mag-
istrate in democratic Athens as being able to impose fines, 
on the one hand, and to conduct lawsuits and preside over 
courts, on the other. Hansen (p. 240) counts about seven 
hundred regular magistrates who were appointed every 
year; this figure does not include the irregular magistrates 
who had special duties. Some held their office alone, so me 
as a member of a board. The largest board of magistrates 
was the Council of the Five Hundred, the boule, which 
participated in so me lawsuits (see 1.5), but strictly speaking 
was neither a judicial magistrate nor a law court (see H.3). 
Normally, in his province the same magistrate handled 
both public and private suits. 
The nine archons. The most honorable, although not 
the most powerfuI, magistrates in Athens were the ni ne 
archons (archontes). Beginning in Archaic times, they rep-
resented the highest executive power in the state in civil 
and religious matters. In the democracy, they were chosen 
by lot. They handled most litigation, but as individual 
magistrates, not as a board. 
The archän (eponymos). Ath. Pol. 56-59 records the 
administrative and judicial duties of the nine archons 
starting with the magistrate, simply called archön, who 
was honored to give his name to the official year. His main 
provinces were family and inheritance matters. Among 
the many public and private cases mentioned in the long 
list of his duties in Ath. Pol. 56.6 are maltreatment of par-
ents, of orphans, and of heiresses, mismanagement of 
orphans' estates, suits against guardians and against par-
ents alleged to be dissipating the family property through 
insanity, and inheritance claims. In his administrative 
capacity, he had charge of certain other legal matters; for 
example, he had to care for widows who claimed to be 
pregnant by their dead husbands, he leased out the estates 
of orphans and heiresses till they reached the age of major-
ity or marriage, and he handled the securities for such 
leases. In the religious sphere, he had to conduct dramatic 
and other contests that often involved jurisdiction between 
citizens disputing which one was better able to bear the 
costs of a performance in the system of "liturgies." These 
few details taken from Aristotle's list show how the 
Athenians organized their highly differentiated jurisdic-
tions according to the executive tasks their magistrates 
held. 
The basileus. The next of the nine archons, the "king" 
(basileus) , had jurisdiction in religious matters, such 
as when two citizens were claiming a priesthood or in 
suits concerning impiety (asebeia). Beginning in Archaic 
times, homicide cases also were considered religious mat-
ters and were conducted by the basileus . These included 
Wounding with intent to kill, arson, and poisoning. The 
religious implications led to some peculiarities in 
procedure. Beginning with the three prodikasiai in the 
preliminary stage, homicide suits were not public but 
private, brought by the victim's next of kin; the plaintiff 
and his witnesses all had to swear solemn oaths to the 
guilt of the defendant, and the opponents similarly swore 
to his innocence; and the basileus issued a formal procla-
rnation that the accused had to keep away from sacred 
places, wh ich meant from all public life, until he got his 
trial. These cases also were heard by different courts than 
profane lawsuits (see 11.2). 
The polemarch . The third archon, called the polemarch 
("war magistrate"), had long aga ceded his military func-
tions to the ten generals, who for good reason were cho-
sen by election, not by lot. Reminiscent of his former 
military province, the polemarch dealt with foreigners 
resident in Athens , called metics. Ath. Pol. 58.3 reports 
that he stood in the same relation to metics as the archon 
to citizens, especially in family and inheritance cases. In 
the preliminary hearing (anakrisis) with the polemarch, 
a citizen claimant could demand sureties for the metic's 
appearance in court. Then these cases, which normally 
arose out of business transactions, were remitted to the 
Forty, who took them over to their own jurisdiction (see 
1.3). Family and inheritance matters , naturally between 
metics only, remained under the control of the pole-
march. Also, when a former master sued a slave he had 
manumitted with conditions, the pole march conducted 
the case. The only public case the polemarch adminis-
tered was the graphe aprostasiou against a metic living 
without patron. 
The six thesmothetai. The remaining archons, the board 
of the six thesmothetai ("givers of laws" -not "Iegislators"), 
apparently never had another function than the adminis-
tration of justice. Their origin is as obscure as their name. 
In the time of the orators, they handled all the very com-
plicated machinery of the court sessions from scheduling 
the dates for aII hearings (Ath. Pol. 59.1) to organizing the 
court days: appointing the jurors by lot and distributing 
them to the various courts presided over by other magis-
trates, supplying them with personnel and equipment, 
and, at the end, paying the jurors (up to fifteen hundred 
and more) for the day's sessions (Ath. Pol. 63-69; see Thür, 
pp. 42-49). As judicial magistrates, they were principally 
concerned with political crimes. They supervised three 
special procedures · of impeachment: eisangelia (denuncia-
tion by "announcement"), katacheirotonia (condemnation 
by show of hands) and probole (denunciation by "presen-
tation"). All three cases resulted from offenses against the 
state, such as treason or attempting tyranny, and the first 
steps were taken by the Council or the Assembly (see 1.5). 
The thesmothetai were only concerned if these political 
bodies referred the decision to a law court (dikastmon). In 
political matters, a number of public suits also came 
before the thesmothetai , and in more private matters so me 
graphai, such as violence (graphe hybreäs) or theft (graphe 
klopes ); however, both charges also could be filed as 
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private suits (dikai). As an executive measure apagoge 
(summary arrest) of an exile who unlawfully returned to 
Attica took place before them, but they had to refer these 
cases to a dikasterion for trial. Even so me private cases 
came to them, such as for theft (dike klopes ) and some 
suits arising out of maritime trade and silver mining. 
Finally, the thesmothetai presided when the scrutiny (doki-
masia) of a magistrate appointed by vote or by lot was 
contested and referred to a court, and when a former mag-
istrate was accused of financial malpractice during his 
year of office (euthynai). There does not appear to be any 
overall concept linking these cases; rather, the thesmoth-
etai seem to have steadily taken on new judicial measures 
that did not fall into the other archons' provinces (see 
Harrison, pp. 15f.). 
Paredroi and grapheus. The three archons mentioned 
first, archon, basileus, and polemarch, were allowed to 
select two assistants (paredroi, assessors; Ath. Pol. 56.1). 
Unlike the archons, these assistants were not chosen by lot 
and the rule against iteration, which applied to the archons, 
seems not to have applied to them. Nevertheless, they had 
to pass a scrutiny (dokimasia) before taking office and an 
accounting (euthynai) at the end of their term. Thus, despite 
the ideal of an amateur; direct democracy, a certain degree 
of professionalism entered into the administration of jus-
tice. The paredroi also enabled the first three archons in 
some cases, for example in overseeing an orphan's estate, to 
fulfill two roIes, acting as the plaintiff and presiding over 
the deciding court. In one of these two roles, the archon 
would be represented by his paredros (Harrison, p. 7). 
The secretary (grapheus, Ath. Pol. 63.1) of the board of 
the six thesmothetai also may have become a professional, 
although he was a magistrate chosen by lot (Ath. Pol. 
55.1-2; Hansen, p. 244). In addition to supplying the board 
with his experience, the secretary of the thesmothetai 
raised the number of the nine archons to ten when they 
supervised the allotment of jurors. From the ten divisions 
(phylai, "tribes") of the Athenian citizenry, these ten mag-
istrates had to provide all the jurors for the individual 
courts each day. 
The Eleven. This board of magistrates, chosen by lot, 
seems to be as old as the archons (Ath. Pol. 7.3). They used 
police power against common criminals and oversaw the 
selling of confiscated properties (Ath. Pol. 52.1). Out of 
both matters legal disputes could arise, which were heard 
at the preliminary stages by a single member of the board, 
who also presided at the trial. Against criminals, three 
measures, originally connected with self-help, took place: 
apagöge (arrest and "conveyance" before the Eleven); 
endeixis ("naming" the arrested to the Eleven); and 
ephegesis ("bringing" one of the Eleven ~'to the place" to 
arrest the criminal). All three were summary measures 
rather than lawsuits. If the arrested confessed or was 
caught red-handed, the Eleven were authorized to carry 
out the death penalty at once. If he denied the charge, a 
court presided over by one of the Eleven decided on life Or 
death (see Hansen). In dealing with confiscation, the 
Eleven received a document from a volunteer prosecutor 
(boulomenos) listing the property the debtor was said to 
own. If the debtor hirnself or by a third party filed a pro-
test (enepiskepsis), the Eleven referred the case to a 
dikasterion. 
The Porty and the diaitetai. For private suits not in the 
jurisdiction of the archons, in earlier times, thirty "deme 
judges" acted as circuit judges administering justice in the 
municipalities (or demes) of Attica. After the restoration 
of democracy in 403/402, the number of these magistrates 
increased to forty, and they were officially known as The 
Forty. They were chosen by lot, four from each tribe, and 
operated in the city as boards of four, grouped by tribe. 
A plaintiff had to sue before the group corresponding to 
the defendant's tribe. If the dispute concerned a matter 
worth ten drachmas (a worker's wage for ten to twenty 
days) or less, a single member of the board decided the 
case; disputes concerning more ten drachmas were referred 
to a court. The Forty were unusual in that they never con-
ducted preliminary hearings (anakriseis) by themselves as 
other magistrates did. Other officials (not magistrates) 
handled that task-the "diaitetai (arbitrators) chosen by 
lot" (Ath. Pol. 53.5), often called "public arbitrators." 
Every male citizen had to serve as a diaitetes in the year 
he was sixty. From this group, the four members of a tribai 
board of the Forty chose by lot a diaitetes from that tribe 
to conduct the preliminary hearing (diaita) for the case. As 
the name of the officer ("arbitrator") indicates, the main 
task of the diaitetes was to reconcile the Iitigants. If he did 
not succeed with this, the procedure of diaita served to 
prepare the case for the trial presided over by one of the 
Forty (Thür, 2004, 40f.). Because metics did not belong to 
the ten tribes, it was difficult to integrate financial law-
suits against them into this system. In this case, the pole-
march first distributed the lawsuits by lot to the ten tribes, 
and the tribai boards of the Forty allotted the respective 
diaitetai. The diaitetai chosen by lot were a vital means of 
handling everyday disputes. Without them, the relatively 
few magistrates, including the Forty, who were in charge 
of most private litigation would have been unable to keep 
negotiable cases out of the expensive, publicly financed 
courts. 
Other magistrates. As seen in the account of the history 
of the Forty, the organization of procedural responsibili-
ties often changed in Athens. When new situations arose, 
the Athenians .did not hesitate to create new magistrates 
or revise the responsibilities of existing magistrates when 
it seemed necessary. The names of these magistrates were 
not used consistently, so that, over the years, magistrates 
with identical names had different competences. What 
remained constant was that a magistrate assigned to a 
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special task also had jurisdiction in this field. Here, a short 
summary of some additions will be sufficient (Harrison, 
pp. 21-36 gives full details of the historical development). 
First, the jurisdiction of the generals (strategoi) was 
extended from military discipline to the costs of furnish-
ing a war ship due to a liturgy (trierarchia). Second, 
although the term eisagögeus, "introducer" (from eisagein, 
"bring a case before a court"), applied in a general sense to 
every magistrate with judicial responsibility, two different 
boards were specifically called eisagögeis. In the fourth 
century, they handled special decisions that had to be ren-
dered within thirty days. Third, before the thesmothetai 
(see 1.1.c) took over cases arising out of sea trade, nauto-
dikai and xenodikai supervised these, and other cases, too. 
Fourth, in literary sources, officers with special jurisdic-
tion for markets, street activity, and accounting are men-
tioned, and stone inscriptions, wh ich are continuously 
being discovered and published, have contributed further 
details, for example Stroud (1974 and 1998). Finally, every 
board overseeing public work or in charge of public funds 
for more than thirty days had jurisdiction in these areas 
(e.g., the orator and politician Demosthenes seems to have 
been a member of the board for constructing the city 
walls; Aisch. 3.14; see also JG IF 244). 
The boule. Like other boards of magistrates, the Council 
(boule) of the Five Hundred could impose fines, wh ich it 
did by vote. lts limit was 500 drachmas, and this had to be 
confirmed by a law court if the person fined refused to pay. 
Although single members of the boule never conducted a 
preliminary hearing or presided over a court, the whole 
council was involved in initiating an eisangelia. In this pro-
cedure, any citizen could denounce a magistrate for mis-
administration or another citizen for a political crime. An 
eisangelia against a magistrate was filed with the boule, 
which heard the parties and voted on the verdict and the 
penalty (Hansen 1975; 1991, pp. 213 and 258). But despite 
the term katagnosis ("vote against"), the bou/e's decision 
technically was not a verdict; rat her, the boule determined 
the indictment (enklema) to be used in the forthcoming 
trial between the accuser and impeached magistrate (Thür, 
p. 604). This lawsuit was conducted by the thesmothetai 
(see above). The second kind of eisangelia, against political 
crimes, started with the Assembly (ekklesia) and could be 
decided by this body. Or the ekklesia could refer the case to 
a dikastenon, and the boule ac ted in the same way as with 
eisangelia of magistrates. 
Courts. In this section, courts are first discussed as bod-
ies that decide lawsuits and second as buildings where 
these bodies met. This distinction is important for the 
term heliaia (literally "assembly") in classical times. It is 
uncertain which sense is meant when Solon is reported in 
Ath. Pol. 9.1 (cf. 7.3) to have given alllitigants the right of 
appeal to a court (eis to dikastenon ephesis). Generally and 
correctly, the dikastenon mentioned by Aristotle is identi-
fied with the Archaic panel called heliaia (see the law 
quoted in Dem. 23.28, cf. 43.75). For the time of Solon, it 
is uncertain whether heliaia meant the whole Assembly of 
the People acting as law court (Harrlson, p. 3) or a smaller 
Juror Identity Card. Clay fragment, fourth century B.C.E. A juror identity card listed the 
name of the juror, his father's name, and his area (demos). PHOTOGRAPH BY JOHN HIOS. AKG-
IMAGES 
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panel as known from later times (Hansen, p. 30). For the 
fifth and fourth centuries, there is no doubt that "heliasts" 
were the members of the democratic dikasteria and a 
panel called heliaia was a large court consisting of at least 
one thousand dikastai, chosen by lot. At that time, a build-
ing called the heliaia was large enough to receive the panel. 
At least for the fourth century B.C.E., its location at the 
agora seems to be solved now (Boegehold, pp. 14-20 and 
99-113; Stroud, pp. 99-101). The entire system of the 
democratic People's Courts also was called heliaia. 
11ze heliastic (or popular) courts. Compared with thp. 
complex responsibilities of the magistrates, the regular 
courts (dikasteria) , wh ich judged most trials, were orga-
nized very simply. On a court day, each Athenian citizen 
over the age of thirty who had not lost his rights and was 
not in debt to the state had the right to sit as juror (heliastes 
or dikastes). On first presenting himself to be enrolled, he 
was given a ticket as documentary evidence (pinakion; see 
Boegehold, plates 7f). At the beginning of each year, every 
juror had to swear the heliastic oath to cast his vote 
according to the laws or, in a case not covered by a law, in 
accordance with his most equitable opinion. All private or 
public lawsuits coming before a dikasterion were con-
ducted in the same way. Only the size of the courts varied: 
a panel of 201 dikastai judged private lawsuits if the mat-
ter at issue was less than 1,000 drachmas, one of 401 if it 
was more. The usual board in public prosecutions was of 
501 but, in important political cases, after a decree by the 
Assembly, several panels were put together ranging from 
1,001 up to 2,501. The odd numbers were fixed to avoid a 
tie. It is doubtful that the number of six thousand men-
tioned in Andoc. 1.17 is correct (this could mean "all 
jurors who turned up," Hansen, p. 187). For a day's ses-
sion, a dikastes got a payment of three obols from the 
state, the low wage of a simple worker. With the great 
number of dikastai to be paid over the whole year Athens 
spent between twenty-two and thirty-seven talents 
(132,000-222,000 drachmas), but it was only a fraction 
of the cost of a single campaign of a few months' war 
(Hansen, p. 189). The court buildings were located at the 
northeast corner of the agora (Boegehold). 
Homicide courts. Rooted in sacred tradition, homicide 
cases were never heard in the regular courts, even in the 
time of the orators. For these cases, an executive board, 
the Council of the Areopagus, could render a verdict, and 
smaller panels than usual were also used-the fifty-one so-
called ephetai (literally "men to whom it is left to decide"). 
The trials took place under open sky at different sanctuar- ' 
ies . Probably, in the democracy, the fifty-one ephetai turned 
out to be ordinary ,dikastai chosen by lot (Ath. Pol. 57.4, 
Wallace, pp. 102-105), or fifty-one members chosen from 
the Areopagus (Carawan, pp. 160-162). The Areopagus 
somehow kept its aristocratic shape being made up of for-
mer archons who became life members after having 
passed their euthynai . There is much discussion about 
these courts and how they developed from the time of 
Draco, whose law on homicide from 6211620 B,C.E. is pre-
served on a fragmentary stone inscription from 409/408 
B.C.E. (TC P 104; Stroud; Gagarin). Although the Areopagus 
is not mentioned in what survives of Draco law, the ephetai 
(who are mentioned) could originally have been drawn 
from that council, which at that time had a fully aristo-
cratic character. It is quite uncertain what in c1assical 
homicide law is due to Draco, to Solon, or to some later 
reforms (Thür, 1990). In the following paragraphs, only 
the time of the orators is considered. 
Two sources give detailed and coherent accounts of the 
different homicide courts and their responsibilities, Dem. 
23.65-79 and Ath. Pol. 57.2-4. According to the kind of 
homicide, the basileus (see I.l.b) had to introduce the par-
ticular case to one of the following five courts. First, the 
Areopagus tried cases in which the charge was phonos ek 
pronoias, "intentional" killing of an Athenian citizen. 
There is much dispute about the meaning of intention 
(Gagarin, 1981 and 1990; Carawan, pp. 33-83), and one 
may ask whether stress lay rather on phonos "killing with 
one's own hand" than on the offender's state of mind 
(MacDowell, pp. 115-117), Intention may have been con-
sidered only for the death penalty (Thür, 1991). The meet-
ing pI ace was the small rocky hill to the west of the 
Acropolis. In the next three courts, the ephetai heard cases. 
For bouleusis ("planning" or "instigating," that is, killing 
not with one's own hand) , unintentional killing, or killing 
an alien or slave (a rather ilIogical composition), the trial 
was at the Palladion, atempie of Pallas Athene outside the 
city. If the accused maintained that the killing was lawful, 
as in self-defense, the case was tried at the Delphinion, a 
temple of Delphic Apollo in southwest Athens. The pen-
alty in these two courts was exile. In the fourth court, 
located at a place at the seashore called Phreatto, the 
ephetai tried an accused who was exiled from Attica and 
who therefore made his defense from a boat offshore. 
A fifth court met at the Prytaneion, the sacred hearth 
of the state, on the northern side of the Acropolis. Here 
only the basileus and the four phylobasileis, religious offi-
cers of the four ancient tribes, heard cases of "homicide" 
by an animal or an inanimate object and, as Aristotle 
writes, by an unknown person. These trials ended with 
only formal verdicts. The reasons for the traditionalloca-
tions are not always obvious; maybe the procedural oaths 
called diämosiai needed to be sworn at the different 
sanctuaries. 
Political assemblies. In Athens, in the same way as the 
large law courts, political bodies-the Assembly of the 
People (ekklesia), the Council of the Five Hundred (boule), 
and the Council of the Areopagus (within the modest rem-
nants of its political functions)-occasionally voted on the 
guilt of aperson. When rendering verdicts they acted as 
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law courts, to be distinguished from preliminary stages of 
an inquiry. As discussed earlier in this article, the ekklesia 
had authority to render sentences in some cases of eisan-
geliai. In the "principal session" held once under each of 
the ten tribes' presidency during the year (prytaneia), it 
was a fixed item on the agenda to ask for entering eisange-
liai. A denunciation, when accepted, could lead to a decree 
to summon a special session for rendering sentence. In 
the first half of the fourth century the ekklesia often 
decided to try such cases in that way instead of passing 
them to the courts. Areform between 362 and 355 B.C.E. 
probably required all eisangeliai to be judged by the heli-
astic courts, maybe out of economic considerations. Ajury 
panel of 501 was much cheaper than an assembly of six 
thousand (Hansen, pp. 159, 214f.). 
In contrast to the ekklesia the councils, the boule and 
the Areopagus, did not have such authority. When prepar-
ing an eisangelia for a dikasterion (see 1.5) the boule heard 
the parties and voted secretly just as a law court did; nev-
ertheless, this only determined the wording of an accusa-
tion and the proposed penalty. Only a court could render 
the definitive sentence. Parallel to eisangelia in the second 
half of the fourth century a new type of public prosecution 
was created, apophasis ("report"), in which the Areopagus, 
the ekklesia, and the dikasteria were all involved. By decree, 
the ekklesia called upon the Areopagus to investigate a 
case. The Areopagus summoned witnesses, questioned 
slaves under torture, and voted on guilty or not. Their 
report was sent to the ekklesia who could confirm it by 
show of hands, choose a number of public accusers, and 
refer the case to a court for definitive judgement. For the 
most famous case with Harpalos, see Wallace (pp. 198-
2001), Hansen (pp. 234f.), and Eder (pp. 201-218). 
Arbitration and Reconciliation. To conclude this sur-
vey of the legal framework of judiciallitigation-the courts 
and the magistrates who supervised them-it seems use-
ful to consider a social phenomenon. Speakers at court 
often say that they had done everything to settle the dis-
pute amicably by a diaita or a dialysis ("settlement"); 
it was the opponent's fault that the case came to trial. This 
indicates that there was strong pressure to avoid trial dur-
ing the hearing before the diaitetes chosen by lot (see 1.3) 
and probably during the anakrisis as wen; even during the 
trial. a compromise was possible right up to the counting 
of the votes (Scafuro, pp. 131-141, with references 393). 
The term diaita was used of either arbitration in the strict 
sense or of reconciliation (Steinwenter). In either case, 
third persons not involved in the case assisted the litigants. 
The difference is that arbitrators, authorized by the liti-
gants, decided the case by award, whereas mediators sug-
gested a compromise to be accepted. or not. Normally, 
each litigant nominated one or more persons in whom he 
trusted. This arrangement was enough for mediation. For 
arbitration, the even number of persons thus selected then 
chose an additional, impartial person to enable majority 
decision and a special agreement was necessary that either 
litigant would abide by (emmenein) the decision. Usually 
the arbitrators had to give the award under oath. 
The legally binding nature of compromises and arbitra-
tion awards has been disputed. It has been held that they 
were just as binding as the decision by a court (Harrison, 
p. 65), but another interpretation is to see these both as 
formalized procedures which carried only ethical weight 
(Scafuro, p. 140). Neither enforcement nor a bar from rais-
ing the same issue before a court seems to be backed by the 
sources. Only when combined with arelease and discharge 
(aphesis kai apallage), that is, after mutually satisfying all 
the claims, could the same issue be barred from being tried 
in court (by a special plea, paragraphe; see Wolff). 
[See also Procedure, subentries on Athens: An Overview 
and Trial Procedure in Ancient Athens.] 
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